

Response to the “Dodgy Dossier” Document

The numbers here refer to the paragraph numbers in the “dodgy dossier.”

1. My positions have been as follows:

November 2012 – Present. Independent contractor and researcher on terrorism and extremism in Canada.

May 2010 to September 2012- Bank of Canada, Security Risk Management Office, (Manager) responsible for risk assessment for IT Security, physical security, infosec, executive protection, supply chain risk, insider risk and ongoing risk assessment to the institution. Also responsible for management of intelligence collection and analysis section and liaison with various domestic and foreign agencies. Analysis of risk based on economy/social unrest factors including ZIRP, monetary imbalances, QE etc.

January 2009 to the December 2012: Senior Research Fellow at the Canadian Center for Intelligence and Security Studies, Norman Patterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, Ottawa.

April 2008 to the May 2010: Security consultant in Ottawa, Canada. Concurrently a member of the European Experts Network on Terrorism and Radicalization. Also a contract lecturer at Carleton University teaching a Masters level course on Strategic Intelligence Theory (Jan-March 2009).

July 2007 – April 2008. Adjunct Senior Fellow, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU. Research based on national security intelligence requirements and terrorism.

April 2006 to June 2007 – Senior Fellow and Program Coordinator for the Risk Assessment and Horizon Scanning Program, Centre of Excellence for National Security, Institute for Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. (Now known as the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies)

April 2002 – March 2006 Royal Canadian Mounted Police - Integrated National Security Enforcement Team (Ottawa, A Division). Primary responsibility for research and analysis into all matters of national security, including risk analysis for political/protest violence, terrorism, various government functions, travels, events, and direct threats to national level personnel. Secondary responsibility for research and analysis into war crimes, drugs, terrorism, and other such matters that concerned the Division Intelligence Officer.

November 2000 to April 2002 – Royal Canadian Mounted Police – Senior Analyst for political and military affairs (War Crimes, Immigration and Passport Fraud Section)

May 2000 to November 2000 - Senior Analyst, Case Management Branch, Modern War Crimes, Citizenship and Immigration, Canada. Responsible for case work, research, analysis and other duties related to war crimes and other security matters within the department.

January 2000 to April 2000 – Office of the Prosecutor, International War Crimes Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Responsible for military analysis of matters related to prosecution of major cases where military and/or political matters were involved.

February 1999 to December 1999 – Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Modern War Crimes Intelligence Section. Responsible for research and analysis in cases related to war crimes. Risk analysis assessments on various individual cases and countries. Also responsible for the production of documents used by overseas posts to screen for potential war criminals or other such security related cases.

October- November 1997 - Citizenship and Immigration Canada. Short term contract project advising on research and analysis into overseas war crimes, crimes against humanity etc.

September 1997 – OSCE Election supervisor in Bosnia (Republic Srpska - Bijeljina and area)

June 95 to August 97 - Canadian Privy Council Office - Intelligence Analyst - Primary responsible for analysis and production of assessment material on Balkan security, political, military and economic matters. Other duties as assigned from time to time at the discretion of the director.

August 94 to May 95 - Director General of Intelligence (Department of National Defence)- Arms control analyst and verification support. Responsible for the enforcement of major arms control treaties such as the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, Vienna Document, and the UN Registry on Conventional Arms. Carried out intrusive on-sight arms control inspections to detect treaty anomalies and problem areas.

February 94 to July 94 - UNPROFOR HQ Zagreb Croatia (United Nations) - Intelligence analyst. Prepared regular briefings for the Special Representative of the Secretary General (Mr Akashi), Force Commander and Deputy Force Commander and Head of Civil Affairs. Delivered formal and informal oral briefings to Force Commander and the SRSG on crisis matters. Responsible for briefings on all UN related matters (i.e. military, security, mujahideen, economic, human rights, war crimes, humanitarian aid). Liaison functions with various agencies such as UNHCR and the ICRC.

May 93 to January 93 - Director General of Intelligence - Arms control analyst. Same as above. Carried out arms control inspections in Albania, Belarus, Poland, Russia and Ukraine.

January 91 to May 93 - Director General of Intelligence. Provided national level intelligence support to the Canadian UN Battalion for the reopening of Sarajevo Airport and missions in Croatia and Bosnia. Provided regular briefings to the Deputy Minister, Chief of Defence Staff, PCO and other government agencies.

July 90 to January 91 - Directorate of International Policy (DND) - Responsible for a wide range of responsibilities involving the international affairs of DND. Prepared briefing books for senior staff visits to foreign countries. Prepared correspondence for the Defence Minister on Canadian involvement in various foreign operations.

1980 -1986 –served as an aero engine technician and aircrew in the Canadian Armed Forces.

1987-1990 Attended St Mary's University and York University on military scholarship (UTMM)

The ranks obtained in the military were – in progressive order - Recruit, Private, Corporal, Master Corporal, Officer Cadet, Lieutenant and Captain.

2. My work as an intelligence analyst was initially for the Canadian Armed Forces. The CAF is not an intelligence agency, it is a military force with its own long established intelligence branch which pre-dates CSIS and CSE. I also worked as an intelligence analyst for the Privy Council Office which is effectively the Cabinet Office for the Government of Canada. It is not an intelligence agency, it directly serves the Prime Minister and the Cabinet on foreign intelligence matters. I also have worked for several government agencies which also have their own intelligence sections. This includes agencies such as CIC where I worked for the War Crimes/Org Crime intelligence section. At the RCMP, I worked for six years as an intelligence contractor. The RCMP, as with many agencies, has its own internal intelligence and criminal analytical section. I worked mainly for INSET – The Integrated National Security Enforcement Section. At other times, I have done contract intelligence work for CBSA and CSE as well as the International War Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.

3. The Centre at Carleton ran out of money, it had no supervisor in place and several of us who were external fellows left. It was an unpaid position from the start.

4. At the Nanyang Technological University I worked for CENS – the Center for Excellence in National Security, which was part of the Rajaratnam School. My position there was a Senior Fellow (one below a full professor in precedence). My work involved research and intelligence production for issues related to national security intelligence requirements. I was not enrolled in any degree granting program or any other course. I returned to Canada after my book was finished (work product).

5. My appearance at the Air India Tribunal was in response to a request from the Air India Families Association. I appeared as a witness only to (mainly) focus on terrorism funding issues.

6. My time at the RCMP was as a civilian contractor. I was recruited to work there by the head of the war crimes unit and was then moved to the INSET shortly thereafter at the request of the head of that unit. At that point, I had no connection to the military in any form. I left the RCMP to take up a Senior Fellow Position I had been offered in Singapore which had a significant salary bump, heavily subsidized housing and generous benefits.

7. I have never been an officer of the peace. I have, however, worked extensively with law enforcement in investigations and other related activities which I am not at liberty to discuss here. I have also worked with military police forces and civilian police forces in the field (UNCIVPOL).

8. A number of media personnel have correctly and incorrectly identified in a number of positions. My general observation is that many reporters have limited knowledge of intelligence, security, police and academic agencies. There is nothing wrong with describing me as a “former RCMP intelligence expert.” I worked for the RCMP as an intelligence contractor and testified in that capacity as a court expert witness while with the RCMP.

11. My work has never included plagiarism and the Federal Court of Canada has recognized my expertise in intelligence and evidence matters.

12. There is not sufficient space or time to discuss this question in full. However, several key points can be made. Most of the references made by Islamist groups to violence are not drawn from the Quran, but rather from a variety of Hadith (Hadeeth), many of which are of doubtful provenance. Many of the most violent actions justified by jihadists are derived from the time of the first Caliph (Omar) and not from the time of Mohammed. All of the major Abrahamic books have decidedly violent aspects to them.

The statements made by me in this area often refer to those people who make stupid statements such as “All Muslims are terrorists.”

13. I have never met Hussein Hamdani and/or his brother or associates. His position as a writer for the Muslim Student Association guide and other such things are covered in my writings. If you have missed them, that is not my problem. His brother, as I noted in my writings, was dismissed from Islamic Relief Canada in 2014.

14. The primary assertion in this that I worked for one or more Canadian defence lawyers for clients in Guantanamo Bay is false. I have never worked in any capacity for any Canadian lawyer who had a client who was ever in Gitmo. As such, the rest of the statements in the paragraph are irrelevant. As noted, I did do a one-day training session in Washington DC at the request of the Pentagon. I have never sought out a position to be a court expert and it was never part of any business model. My four certifications as a court expert were at the request of government agencies and law firms that requested I work for them. There was no (ie zero) extra dollars involved in my initial certification as a court expert as I was already being paid as a contractor for the RCMP at the time.

15. The assertion in this paragraph are false. The appointment as a court expert is on your personal record permanently and it does not have an “expiry date.” In practice, every time you testify the court and the opposing council have the right to challenge the position of the court expert as to the relevance and credibility of their information and its value to the case. It has been my experience that judges (Federal) and council are fully cognizant of their ability to challenge credentials and they do so with great vigour as I have experienced on all four occasions.

16. I am not anti-American. I have served extensively in the field and at sea with American service personnel. My immediate supervisor in the field in the former Yugoslavia was a USMC Colonel. I have worked in the Pentagon at NMJIC – The National Military Joint Intelligence Center. As with anyone who has the most minimal experience in legal affairs, it was clear that the entire purpose of the Gitmo trials was to operate outside of the usual legal framework. Individuals with far greater legal minds than mine have written books on the ills of the Gitmo legal system. Overall, it caused more credibility damage than it helped.

17. As is noted in the paragraph, it was an *alleged* Islamist who in the fullness of time and at the end of the process was determined to have never been a national security threat to Canada. It is also true that the Muslim Brotherhood swore off violence, a position that they held from (roughly) 1974 to the early 1990s. The Muslim Brotherhood is now back in a full violent position whereby they are calling for violent attacks and they advise their followers they should seek martyrdom. A variety of Islamist groups have often cooperated with each and have also committed the most horrible acts of violence against each other. Al Qaeda complained about the role of the Muslim Brotherhood in Afghanistan during the 1980s and al-Zarqawi made incredibly violent statements against the Muslim Brotherhood during his operations in Iraq.

18. I advocated on behalf of Mr Almrei because I believed he had been falsely accused using “evidence” that was, on a number of occasions fake or grossly misleading. As is known, the Federal Court of Canada completely cleared Mr Almrei of any terrorist activities or “membership” in al Qaeda. My work in doing testimony for law firms has always been a sideline, not a “business model.”

For the record, I was asked by two other law firms to testify for them on behalf of Muslims who had been accused of national security related offence (National Security Certificates). In the other two cases, I did extensive work for them and then told them I could not testify on their behalf. In those two cases it was my belief that the individuals involved were exactly what the national security certificate case said they were – terrorists. As such, I would not work on their behalf.

19. The question in this paragraph lacks context. On one hand, al-Qaeda had been significantly hurt by 2009 and their operational capabilities were weak compared to their peak days from the mid-1990s to the post 9/11 period. So the answer to an operational question would be “Al Qaeda was weakened.” However, if a different question was asked – for instance – if the al Qaeda brand is/was still strong and did it pose a national security threat due to its ability to serve as a radicalizing ideology, then the answer would be yes. You can see my article in Perspective on Terrorism with the title *Understanding al-Qaeda's Ideology for Counter-Narrative Work*.

The current situation is similar with respect to ISIS. ISIS is no longer an operational threat as of February 2019 because it has been physically destroyed. So it is fair to say: ISIS is not longer a threat. The other reality is that its history and propaganda from ISIS will serve as a recruiting and radicalization force for at least a generation to come. So it is fair to say: ISIS remains a significant threat. The answer, of course, depends on the nature and context of the question(s) asked.

20. As it turns out, al Qaeda never had a sleeper agent program despite the hysteria that immediately followed 9/11. Further research has shown this. Dr. Marc Sageman is former CIA field operative turned psychiatrist who has been described in court as the foremost terrorist profiler in the world. His work is regularly used by Government of Canada intelligence agencies to support their views. He stated in his book *Leaderless Jihad* (and was quoted in court) as saying that there are no sleeper agent in the USA with one possible exception (in 2001) which itself seems unlikely. Also, the US military did an extensive search of all captured al Qaeda documents from Afghanistan and found no reference to any sleeper agent program. No training. No budget. No handlers. No planning and no operations. Therefore the entire premise of this paragraph is false.

Dr. Mark Stout, the program director of global security studies at Johns Hopkins University, a former intelligence analyst with the U.S. State Department and Central Intelligence Agency and the author of multiple books and articles on Al Qaeda has similar views. He stated, “I am completely unaware of any evidence of sleeper agents in that formal sense ever existing. What it really boils down to is that in the first months and few years after 9/11, the notion of an al-Qaida sleeper agent was entirely plausible, but it just never ever panned out.” Dr Stout had been able to review all relevant intelligence captured from Afghanistan.

The Federal Court of Canada addressed this issue and ruled:

The supposition that Al Qaeda has created “cells” and sent “sleepers” abroad is a matter of some controversy. As noted, the sole source for the statement about cells is a newspaper article from January 2001. In paragraph 34 of the summary there is a statement that the Bin Laden network uses “sleepers” in its international terrorist operations. These are described as individuals who establish themselves in foreign countries for extended periods of time prior to being given orders to execute an operation. Preceding the activation of the operation, they may live as regular citizens, leading unremarkable lives,

and avoiding attention from local authorities. The sole source that is given for these propositions is a 1999 book by Simon Reeve entitled The New Jackals.

21. As noted, my assertion at the time that there were no sleeper cells was proved correct. As such, the issue raised in 21(a) is wrong.

With reference to subparagraph C, my point was that the issue of the pig's head had been reported earlier in the press. The issue was not and has not been raised with respect to the attack on the Quebec City mosque. While not raised here, it should also be noted that the burning of the car of the Imam at the Quebec City mosque was never raised in the criminal trial, nor was the blogsite that extensively examined the Muslim Brotherhood's role in the mosque. Also, the leaflet campaign in the neighbourhood which had the same info as the blog site was not raised. As such, my statements were correct.

The assertion in sub paragraph "d" is correct. I did transpose the names of Sheema Khan and Seema Khan incorrectly. One was the founder of CAIR CAN/NCCM whose parent agency, CAIR USA would go on to be a listed terrorist group. US court document also identify it as a Hamas front group and terrorism funding outfit. The other Khan was an employee of ISNA and worked with their "Development Fund." That organization would have its charitable status revoked by the CRA as it was found to be funding terrorism. Upon being advised of the error in name spelling, it was immediately corrected.

22. The assertions made in this paragraph are false. I did not say that the intelligence community was of little substance. However, I did point out in the slides (which I still have) that the intelligence process and the legal process are highly similar in how they gather, assess and employ information. The reality is, however, that lawyers in court rooms tend to work with more concrete and solid evidence which tends to be more "black and white" than intelligence analysts. Their world of operations, out side of court house walls, tends to be more in shades of grey. Also, the legal profession is several hundred, if not thousand years old, while the intelligence community in its modern form is just over one hundred years old. Legal tradition and precedence have had more time to develop than intelligence. I have said, that in specific cases (read Almrei) that the intelligence agency that wrote up the Almrei national security certificate willfully put false information into the court room. In one example, the agency attempted to say that Hassan Almrei had been able to penetrate the secure side of the Toronto Pearson Airport with other Muslim males. The agency did not mention in their report that Alrei was actually employed there as an aircraft cleaner. The agency also did not note that in addition the other Muslim males who were there, there were also some six or seven other non-Muslims who were working there as well. The agency also did not state that the RCMP had already investigated the situation and dismissed the entire case out of hand. But willfully entering such information into court, the intelligence process was also diminished.

The agency also tried to enter an academic article into Federal Court which was aimed at supporting their positions on terrorism and document forgery. The problem was that neither the agency's analysts nor its lawyer appeared to have verified any of the information in the "peer reviewed" article they were using to support their case. The article was completely bogus and based on false information. Again, the intelligence agency in questioned diminished its own stature by its own action. This can be seen in the Almrei decision or it can be seen in the Perspectives on Terrorism article with the title: *Words Matter: Peer Review as a Failing Safeguard*. The article was written by myself and it was me who walked the court though the false information used in the article.

Alan Barnes, a well respected and highly experienced intelligence analysts came to some conclusions as well in a 2019 publication. The title of his article was *A confusion, not a system: the organizational evolution of strategic intelligence assessment in Canada, 1943 to 2003*. It is available at Intelligence and National Security, DOI: 10.1080/02684527.2019.1578043 or at the on-line Francis & Taylor journals via a government or university library, with the link is: <https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2019.1578043>.